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Responsibility for Biological Diversity
Conservation Under International Law
CatherineTinker'
ABSTRACT
Professor Tinker begins with a general discussion of
biodiversity law within the context of existing international
environmental issues and traditional international
lawmaking. The article analyzes the legal issues that attend
the fulfillment of the objectives of the Biodiversity Convention.
The article examines the work of the International Law
Commission on state responsibility and liability for
The article then explores the
environmental harm.
precautionaryprinciple and argues that it should be more
aggressively applied in order to fulfll the mandate of the
Biodiversity Convention.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The international law on biological diversity has developed
along with scientific understanding and now embodies an
ecosystem approach to the conservation of the variety of life. The
ecosystem concept and a basic sense of state responsibility not to
harm the environment was formulated in 1972 in the Stockholm
Declaration' and later, in the World Charter for Nature. 2 Since
Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration, the concept has
crystallized in customary international law, but it did not appear
in binding treaty law until the United Nations Convention on
Biological Diversity (the Convention or Treaty)3 entered into force
in 1993.
Earlier wildlife protection treaties contained some
aspects of the approach that was later adopted in the Biodiversity
Convention. For example, the Ramsar Convention 4 adopted a

1.
Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the
Human Environment, June 16, 1972, U.N. Doc. A/CON.48/14/Rev. 1, 11 I.L.M.

1416 [hereinafter Stockholm Declaration].
For a description of the chronology of international environmental initiatives,
from the Stockholm Declaration to the U.N. Convention on Biological Diversity,
see David E. Bell, The 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity: The Continuing
Significance of U.S. Objections at the Earth Summit, 26 GE0. WASH. J. INT' L. &
ECON. 479,492-507 (1993).
2.
G.A. Res. 7, U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 17, U.N. Doc.
A/37/51 (1982), reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 455 (1983) (adopted on Oct. 28, 1982)
[hereinafter World Charter for Nature].
3.
Opened for signature, June 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 818 (entered into force
Dec. 29, 1993) [hereinafter Biodiversity Convention].
4.
Convention on Wetlands of International Importance Especially as
Waterfowl Habitat, Feb. 2, 1971, 996 U.N.T.S. 245, 11 I.L.M. 969 [hereinafter
Ramsar Convention].
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habitat and sustainable use approach to the conservation of
wetlands; the World Heritage Convention s has been a factor in
some national development plans that were altered to avoid
damage to listed sites.
The nature of state responsibility under Principle 21, which is
not to harm the territory of other states or the territory beyond
national jurisdiction, is still evolving. One way of implementing
the goals contained in Article 36 of the Biodiversity Convention is
to apply the precautionary principle, which requires restraint of
any human activity that may adversely affect biodiversity. The
precautionary principle in international environmental law is one
response to the popular recognition that preventive action in the
face of scientific uncertainty about future harm is necessary. The
precautionary principle lowers the burden of proof required for
blocking proposed or existing activities that may have serious
long-term harmful consequences. There is no agreement on the
content of the precautionary principle nor is there consensus on
whether a principle, rather than an approach, has actually
emerged. "Nevertheless, countries have begun to develop precise
7
and useful formulations of the principle in specific contexts."
There is tremendous scientific uncertainty about the loss of
biodiversity caused by various human activities, both lawful and
unlawful. The numbers and types of life forms that exist as

genes, species, sub-species, microorganisms, and bacteria in
various ecosystems and habitats are a vast unknown. In the face
of this, the precautionary principle requires an even greater
degree of restraint in human activity to conserve and sustainably
use biodiversity. Perhaps, for now, the precautionary principle
should mandate a policy of "no action." Such an interpretation
would be consistent with those who have called for a clarification
of the notion of responsibility and prevention in environmental
concerns. As one author has asserted, "[i]t is no longer sufficient
to talk of state responsibility for environmental damage. The
context must change to reflect state responsibility for the
preservation of global environmental well-being."s

5.
Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural
Heritage, Nov. 23, 1972, 27 U.S.T. 37, 1037 U.N.T.S. 151 [hereinafter World
Heritage Convention].
6.
"States have... the responsibility to ensure that activities within their
jurisdictions or control do not cause damage to the environment ..
Biodiversity Convention, supranote 3, art. 3.
7.
Edith Brown Weiss, International Environmental Law: Contemporary
Issues and the Emergence of a New World Order, 81 GEO. L.J. 675, 690 (1993).
8.
Susan H. Bragdon, National Sovereignty and Global Environmental
Responsibility: Can the Tension Be Reconciled for the Conservation of Biological
Diversity?, 33 HARV. INTLL.J. 381, 391 (1992).
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Traditional international lawmaking or standard-setting is an
inherently slow process. This is particularly true in international
environmental law where there is very little consensus
surrounding existing norms.
Soft law, customary law, and
treaties are needed to set standards and define legally-binding
duties and obligations based on the precautionary approach.
Existing environmental treaties need to be enforced and
additional states urged to ratify them. To ensure the highest
degree of compliance, the principle of precautionary action to
avoid environmental harm must be recognized in international
law as a means of fulfilling states' obligations to conserve,
sustainably use, and equitably share biodiversity.
The United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity
codifies a line of soft law and international custom to create hard
law in the treaty. The obligations accepted by states party to the
Convention are threefold: conservation of biodiversity; sustainable
use of biological diversity; and equitable sharing of biodiversity
benefits. 9 States party to the Convention are mandated to
establish national legislation and plans. In order to fully comply
with the treaty, these internal laws and development plans must
take into account the responsibility accepted under the Principle
21 language and the jurisdictional scope article, Article 4.
Arguably, to fully comply with the letter and spirit of the
Convention, states must apply the precautionary principle in their
decision-making processes and whenever they take action under
national legislation and development plans.
Full application of the principle of precautionary action may
require states to forego the short-term financial opportunities
available from resource depletion and loss of biodiversity in order
to secure long-term human benefits for the planet and future
generations. For those developing countries in which poverty,
disease, and starvation make it almost impossible to forego shortterm but destructive gains, the Convention offers means of
financing biodiversity conservation projects and the transfer of
appropriate technology.
In the meantime, the Convention
requires states to monitor, study, and catalogue the rich
storehouse of genetic variety contained in their rain forests, coral
reefs, wetlands, deserts, and coastal zones.
When greater
scientific certainty about the effect of human activity on
ecosystems and habitats is achieved, planners, lawyers, and
diplomats may be better able to balance conservation and
sustainable use of biological diversity. In the meantime, the lack
of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for

9.

Biodiversity Convention, supranote 3, art. 1.
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postponing measures to avoid or minimize a threat of significant
reduction or loss of biological diversity.
International attention should be drawn to formulating global
responsibility for biodiversity conservation and sustainable use.
The Convention on Biological Diversity echoes Principle 22 of the
Stockholm Declaration with a weak reference to the need to study
state liability. It may be fruitful for such a study to follow the
guidance of two other Stockholm Declaration principles.1 0
Principle 4 states that "[humanity] has a special responsibility to
safeguard and wisely manage the heritage of wildlife and its
habitat, which are now gravely imperiled by a combination of
adverse factors. Nature conservation, including wildlife, must
therefore
receive importance
in planning for economic
development."'
Principle 5 states that "[t]he non-renewable
resources of the earth must be employed in such a way as to
guard against the danger of their future exhaustion and to ensure
that benefits from such employment are shared by all
[humanity]." 2
The arguments for global conservation of
biological diversity are weighted in favor of intangibles: aesthetics
or preservation of open space or potential value for generations
not yet born, based on equity or fairness.
This article analyzes the legal issues that attend fulfillment of
the ambitious objectives of the Convention on Biological Diversity.
This article also notes areas of ambiguity in the Convention,
which remain to be clarified, and emphasizes responsibility for
loss of biodiversity and prevention of that loss. Part II explores
the failure of the traditional international, law of state
responsibility and liability to adequately protect the environment.

Part II also reviews the U.N. International Law Commission's work
on draft articles that incorporate a preventive or precautionary
approach, specifically the draft articles on state responsibility and
liability for environmental harm from lawful activities.
This
article suggests that a more appropriate legal approach is the
application of the precautionary principle,13 which seeks to
prevent harm rather than determine liability and damages after
harm has occurred.
Part III argues that as greater scientific knowledge is
achieved, the precautionary principle should be applied to all
proposed human actions that may cause a loss of biodiversity,
alter ecosystems and habitats, or affect genetic material. The

10.
11.
12.
13.
part III.

Stockholm Declaration, supranote 1, princ. 22.
Id. princ. 4.
Id. princ. 5.
For definitions and sources of the precautionary principle, see infra
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article concludes that the principle of precautionary action may
be seen as the means of enforcing the Biodiversity Convention
and used as a procedural test to decide whether a proposed use of
biodiversity is sustainable.
Ultimately, the real test of the
Convention on Biological Diversity will be the extent to which its
provisions safeguard the planet's rich biological diversity, and the
extent to which humans can undertake development projects
without irrevocably destroying their global genetic heritage.
II.

STATE RESPONSIBILITY AND LIABILITY

Under traditional concepts of international law, the doctrine
of state responsibility developed to address the relationship
between a given state and citizens of other countries. 14 The
concept of state responsibility presupposes a clear legal duty or
obligation for states to comply with a principle on the
international plane or an obligation arising under treaty or
customary law.
The state-alien example implicates the
international principle of nondiscrimination against aliens and
treaty obligations involving the treatment of diplomatic persons or
the right of innocent passage. In the early 1970s, the concept of
state responsibility was broadened to include any internationally
wrongful acts.
The problem for international law is to interpret the concept
of state responsibility in the environmental context. The U.S.
understanding of international law is codified in the Restatement
(Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, which
states that a nation is obligated to take necessary measures to
ensure that activities within the jurisdiction or control of that
state conform to "generally accepted" international rules or
standards. s Even in the absence of an injury, a state is
responsible to all other states for any violation of this obligation16
and for any resultant significant injury to "the environment of
another state or to its property, or to persons or property within
that state's territory or under its jurisdiction or control." 17 The
application of the broad language of Section 601, however, is

14.
See, e.g., RICHARD B. LILLICH, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF STATE
RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURIES TO ALIENS (1983); CHITrARANJAN F. AMERASINGHE, STATE
RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURIES TO ALIENS (1967); CLYDE EAGLETON, THE RESPONSIBILITY
OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1928).
15.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED

STATES § 601 (1986) [hereinafter RESTATEMENr].
16.

Id. para. 1.

17.

Id.
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limited by the state's obligation to take only "such measures as
may be necessary, to the extent practicable under the
circumstances .... "is
"Generally accepted" international obligations and rules of
conduct related to international environmental law now require,
inter alia, the conservation and sustainable use of biological
diversity and nonrenewable natural resources. At the same time,
pressures for resource development and short-term economic gain
encourage a broad range of public and private activities that
adversely affect the environment, either now or in the future. In
the area of generally accepted international obligations, state
responsibility is triggered by the de minimis duty to observe the
principle of sic utere tuo ut alienurn non laedas.19 Thus, states
have a general duty to prevent uses of their territory that cause
significant harm to other states. 20 A state causing transboundary
pollution is obligated to take reasonable measures to protect
neighboring states from harm and to compensate them for
22
damage. 2 ' In addition, there may be obligations erga omnes;
the Restatement contemplated these obligations as they apply to
areas beyond national jurisdiction 23 and they are described by the
24
International Court of Justice in the BarcelonaTraction case.

18.

Id.

19.

This phrase is roughly translated as a form of the golden rule or good

neighborliness-an injunction to use one's property in a manner that does not
injure another's property. It is related to the civil law concept of "abuse of rights."
One classic example of the principle is the idea that neighbors may not build
"spite fences" to separate themselves from one another.
National laws also contain "the doctrine that makes an otherwise proper

exercise of one's property rights wrongful unless the use [sic] compensates the
person who is injured by the use." LOUIS HENKIN ErAL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES
AND MATERIALS 1380 (3d ed. 1993).
See also JAMES BARROS & DOUGLAS M.
JOHNSTON, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF POLLUTION 74-76 (1974).
20.

LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 291 (Hersh Lauterpacht ed., 8th

ed., 1955), cited inHENIN ETAL., supranote 19, at 552.
21.
JUIITA BRUNN E, ACID RAIN AND OZONE LAYER DEPLETION: INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND REGULATION 115 n.144 (1986) (citing John B. Lyle, Note, International
Liability and Primary Rules of Obligation: An Application to Acid Rain in the United
States and Canada, 13 GA. J. INTL & COMP. L. 111, 113 (1983)). See also Trail
Smelter Case (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1911 (1938), 1938 (1941) [hereinafter Trail
Smelter Case].
22.
Erga omnes obligations are obligations owed to the international
community as a whole, rather than just to another state.
23.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 15, §§ 601, 902(1).
24.
Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belg. v.

Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 4 (Feb. 5).
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A. The InternationalLaw Commission'sApproach- State
Responsibilityfor InternationallyWrongful Acts
The United Nations International Law Commission (I.L.C.)
differentiates internationally wrongful acts from activities not
contrary to international law.
The first give rise to state
responsibility. 25 The second give rise to liability for injurious
consequences. It is well established in international law that
breach of a rule of international law entails state responsibility for
an internationally wrongful act. 26 The I.L.C.'s 1980 Draft on
State Responsibility 27 specified:
"There is an internationally
wrongful act of a State when conduct consisting of an action or
omission is attributable to the State under international law; and
that conduct constitutes a breach of an international obligation of
28
the State."
The I.L.C. approach to state responsibility is to differentiate
between "primary rules" and "secondary rules" of conduct that
specify the action or refusal to act, which triggers state
responsibility. Primary rules are obligations; secondary rules
determine the legal consequences of failure to abide by primary
rules. 29 Secondary rules "specifically [deal] with the issues of
responsibility and liability, although these issues cannot always
"30
actually be separated from the operation of the primary rules.

Allott has taken issue with the possibly meaningless distinction

25.
THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION'S DRAFIT ARTICLES ON STATE
RESPONSIBILITY (Shabtai Rosenne ed., 1991); UNITED NATIONS CODIFICATION OF STATE
RESPONSIBILITY (Marina Spinedi & Bruno Simma eds., 1987).
26.
Chorz6w Factory Case, 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, at 27-28 (Sept.
13).
27.
Report of the InternationalLaw Commission to the General Assembly,
U.N. GAOR, 35th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 59, U.N. Doc. A/35/10 (1980)
[hereinafter Commission Report], reprintedin [1980] 1 Y.B. INrL L. COMM'N 32, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1980/ADD.I (PARr 2).
For a chronology of codification efforts on state responsibility, see David J.
Bederman, ContributoryFaultand State Responsibility, 30 VA. J. INT'L L. 335, 34042 (1990).
See also Pierre-Marie Dupuy, The International Law of State
Responsibility: Revolution or Evolution?, 11 MICH. J. INrL L. 105 (1989) (discussing
the evolution of the law of state responsibility).
28.
Commission Report, supranote 27, art. 3.
29.
On the distinction between primary and secondary rules, see in
particular J. Combacau & D. Alland, 'Primary'and 'Secondary' Rules in the Law of
State Responsibility: CategorizingInternational Obligations, 16 NEIH. Y.B. INT'L L.
81 (1985); Gfinther Handl, Liability as an ObligationEstablishedby a PrimaryRule
ofInternationalLaw, 16 NEIT. Y.B. INTL L. 49 (1985).
30.
Francisco 0. Vicufia, State Responsibility, Liability, and Remedial
Measures Under InternationalLaw: New Criteriafor Environmental Protection, in
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 124, 128 (Edith Brown Weiss ed.,
1992).
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between primary and secondary rules and with the amount of
time that has been invested over the past four decades in
belaboring the point. Allott charges that the resultant delay in
the formulation of the I.L.C. draft on state responsibility, "is doing
serious long-term damage to international law and international
society."3 1 Even more seriously, Allott charges that the I.L.C.'s
process and states' substantive approach to state responsibility
virtually 2assure that states will not be held accountable for their
3
actions.
Under traditional public international law, three threshold
questions are used to determine state responsibility: Was there a
duty under international law? Was the duty breached? Can
responsibility be attributed to a state for the violation of
international law?3 Acts by nonstate entities, such as a citizen
or official for whose acts a state is not responsible, do not give rise
to state responsibility. Through the doctrine of attribution,
however, a state can be responsible for the acts of its own citizens
against another state.
The I.L.C. maintains that state responsibility attaches only to
internationally wrongful acts. Although the violation of a clearlydefimed treaty obligation or an unequivocally recognized norm of
customary law clearly constitutes an internationally wrongful act,
the I.L.C. has neither listed nor defined other potentially wrongful
acts. Under the I.L.C. rubric, state responsibility is triggered
when a state commits an international delict, regardless of
whether any injury results. Once a state accepts binding duties,
any failure to observe them necessarily amounts to a breach of
international obligations. The breach may provoke a variety of
responses, ranging from state protests to formal diplomatic
expressions of displeasure and censure throughout the world
community.34
A state may raise a defense to its breach of an international
obligation; in I.L.C. parlance, these defenses are known as
"conditions precluding wrongfulness."3 5 The defenses include
necessity, prior consent, self-defense, and force majeure.3 6 They

31.
Philip Allott, State Responsibility and the Unmaking of InternationalLaw,
29 HARV. INT L.J. 1, 1 (1988).
Id. at 16.
32.
STATE
33.
See, e.g., IAN BROWNLIE, SYSTEM OF THE LAW OF NATIONS:
RESPONSIBILIY, PART I (1983); Gunther F. Handl, Book Review, 18 Intl Law. 748
(1984).
34.
See RESTATEMENT, supranote 15, §§ 901-07.
35.
If state responsibility encompasses an absolute liability rather than a
strict liability standard, then no defenses whatsoever are available.
HENKIN ErAL., supra note 19, at 561-70.
36.
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may be raised in many situations, including a failure to observe
the precautionary principle that causes transboundary pollution
or degradation of biological diversity. Because the international
obligation at issue is one that requires the state to balance
competing interests, almost every state can be expected to raise a
defense such as necessity. Here the difficulty of defining and
applying the precautionary principle becomes apparent. If the
precautionary principle is merely a guideline to actions that may
accomplish other goals, then it cannot be a primary rule or an
obligation for purposes of state responsibility analysis.
The
application of the precautionary principle may be seen as a
consequence of attempting to fulfill a primary obligation.
Although state responsibility does not arise unless there is a
breach of an international obligation, the breaching action or
inaction must be attributable to the state.
Difficulties of
attribution are inherent in the concept of objective responsibility,

because a state is always liable for the acts of its officials and
organs, even when they act ultra vires.37
Grotius

viewed

the

culpa as

the

Brownlie notes that

proper

basis

of

state

responsibility.3 8 Brownlie, however, moved beyond the confines
of fault to a more realistic test when he wrote that one "need not
qualify responsibility of a state for an internationally wrongful act
by the negligence (culpa) or intention (dolus) of the actor."3 9 In
the I.L.C.'s consideration of objective state responsibility,
negligence or fault is not generally important for determining
state responsibility" or establishing an internationally wrongful

37.
"[T]he public law analogy of the ultra vires act is more realistic than a
seeking for subjective culpa in specific natural persons who may, or may not,
'represent' the legal person (the state) in terms of wrongdoing.... The state also
bears an international responsibility for all acts committed by its officials or its
organs which are delictual according to international law, regardless of whether
the official organ has acted within the limits of his competency or has exceeded
those limits." IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 437-40 (4th
ed. 1990) (citing Estate of Jean-Baptiste Caire v. United Mexican States, 5 R.I.A.A.
516, 529-31 (1929)).
38. [Tjhere is no need to show fault in the sense of malicious intent or
negligence on the part of the State officials responsible for the action or
inaction. . . . [O]pinions of eminent authorities such as Lauterpacht,
Verdross and Eagleton . . . have favoured the Grotian view that State
responsibility rests on "the conception of States as moral entities
accountable for their acts and omissions in proportion to the mens rea of
their agents, the real addressees of international duties ......
OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 203 (1991) (quoting
HERSH LAUTERPACHT, PRIVATE LAW SOURCES AND ANALOGIES 137 (1970)).
39.
BROWNLIE, supranote 37, at 437.
40.
Id. at 437-39. Negligence and fault are, however, pertinent when
determining reparations. Id.
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act. After several years of inattention to the topic of state
responsibility, in 1993 the I.L.C. formally adopted articles on
compensation,
in-kind,
restitution
reparation,
cessation,
and
of
nonrepetition,
satisfaction and assurances, and guarantees
41
articles.
the
to
commentaries
detailed
included exceptionally
Consideration of whether to include a draft article on
"international crimes" was postponed until the I.L.C.'s 1994
session. International crimes include internationally wrongful
acts that are considered "essential for the protection of the
fundamental interests of the international community" as a
whole. 4 2 In its list of proposed international crimes, draft Article
19(3)(d) includes the serious breach of an international obligation

of essential importance for the safeguarding and preservation of
Thus, according to the proposal,
the human environment.
massive pollution of the atmosphere or of the seas would
constitute an international crime.4 The I.L.C. remains divided
on this controversial subject. Some members consider the same
serious acts to be wrongful acts or to be violations of ergo omnes
obligations. From this perspective, there is no need to use the
label "crimes." In contrast, other I.L.C. members consider the
same acts to be crimes and believe that "crimes" is an appropriate
label."
B. The InternationalLaw Commission's Approach" Liability of
Statesfor Injurious Consequences of Acts Not Contraryto
InternationalLaw
If an exporting state-or a company within its jurisdiction or
control-failed to obtain prior informed consent from the
importing state and shipped hazardous biotechnology products,

Report of the InternationalLaw Commission on the Work of its Forty-Fifth
41.
Session, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 79, U.N. Doc. A/48/10 (1993)
[hereinafter 1993 I.L.C. Report].
The draft articles on countermeasures are not part of this report because they

lacked commentaries necessary for their approval. Robert Rosenstock, Current
Development, The Forty-Fifth Session of the InternationalLaw Commission, 88 AM.
J. INT'L L. 134, 134 n.1 (1994). Countermeasures are actions that are generally
legally impermissible. They may, however, be taken by a victim state against a

state that has committed an intentionally wrongful act. Under a further proposal
by the Special Rapporteur, countermeasures may require binding third-party
dispute settlement. Id. at 136.
Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Twenty42.
Eighth Session, U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/28/10 (1976),

reprinted in 2 Y.B. Intl L. Comm'n 95, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1976/Add.1 (pt.
2) (1976).
Id. at 96.
43.
Rosenstock, supranote 41, at 137-38.
44.
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such an activity could be considered an internationally wrongful
act, and thus trigger state responsibility regardless of whether
any harm occurred. On the other hand, the shipment could be
considered an activity not contrary to international law, which
could only trigger liability for the exporting state if there were
injurious consequences. The need to fit the facts of a given
situation into these particular categories-whether the distinction
is meaningful or not-arises from the decision of the I.L.C. 45 to
split the issue into two separate topics: state responsibility for
internationally-wrongful acts, consisting of both primary and
secondary obligations; and international liability for injurious
consequences of activities not contrary to international law.
On a theoretical level, it is not clear that the conceptual basis

on which it-liability for injurious consequences of activities not
contrary to international law-is distinguished from state
responsibility is either sound or necessary. On a more practical
level, it is questionable whether it represents a useful basis for
codification and development of existing law and practice relating
to environmental harm, the field in which the Commission has
mainly located the topic. From either perspective, it is liable to
seem at best a questionable exercise in reconceptualising an
existing body of law or, at worst, a dangerously retrograde step
that may seriously weaken international efforts to secure
agreement on effective principles of international environmental
law.46
The I.L.C. draft on liability for the injurious consequences of
activities not contrary to international law states that civil liability
will attach when four factors are present. There must be: (1)
human activity; (2) the activity must be within the territory or
control of a state; (3) the activity must be capable of giving rise to
harm; and (4) there must be actual harm to persons or things
within the territory or control of another state. 4 7 Unlike the
doctrine of state responsibility, which can attach even in the
absence of harm, the concept of liability requires actual harm.
Most commentators agree that the harm must be "substantial" or
"serious," because state liability should not attach to minor

45.

For a critique of this decision, see Daniel B. Magraw, Transboundary

Harm: The International Law Commission's Study of 'InternationalLiability,' 80

AM. J. INr'LL. 305 (1986).
46.
Alan E. Boyle, State Responsibility and International Liability for
Injurious Consequences of Acts Not Prohibited by InternationalLaw: A Necessary
DistinctionP,39 INT'L& COMP. L.Q. 1, 1 (1990).
47.
Report of the InternationalLaw Commission on the Work of its Forty.
second Session, U.N. GAOR, 42nd Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/42/10 (1990).
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incidents.4 8 There are several unanswered questions surrounding
the draft. These questions include the draft's intended meaning
of "control" and whether the4 9draft applies when a state fails to act
to remove a natural danger.
The I.L.C.'s current approach to liability is to "focus on
prevention of harm from activities that constitute a particular
risk." The I.L.C. begins by clarifying that the scope of the article
includes lawful activities that "create a risk of causing significant
transboundary harm through their physical consequences." The
I.L.C. defines risk to include both "a low probability of causing
disastrous harm and a high probability of causing other
significant harm." The I.L.C. then goes on to address prior
risk assessment, and measures to minimize
authorization,
so
risks.
States are most likely to be deterred from causing
environmental harm if some standard of liability is imposed.
Whether the system is grounded in strict liability or negligence is
of considerably less importance. If international law adopts a
liability system, states will be liable for environmental damage
caused by both public and private actors, regardless of whether
the harm occurs within another state or beyond the boundaries of
national jurisdiction. The liability approach best protects the
rights of innocent victims of environmental harm because it shifts
the burden of proof and makes it possible to collect prompt,
adequate, and effective compensation s5 once injury is established.
Of course, the most effective way to protect the rights of the
innocent is to prevent the harm or destruction from occurring in
the first place.
One of the most difficult issues facing the I.L.C. is whether to
impose a strict liability system or a fault-based system. For a
number of obvious political and financial reasons, states are
reluctant to adopt strict liability and therefore lack the will to
negotiate an environmental liability protocol.5 2 On the other
hand, "the very absence of responsibility or liability provisions

48.
49.
50.

Id.
Id.
Rosenstock, supra note 41, at 139.

RESTAMEMENT, supranote 15, § 604(2).
51.
In fear of possible liability for environmental harm from their own
52.
activities, no state is leading the charge to impose international liability. For
example, following the Chernobyl accident, one might have expected states such
as Sweden to bring a case against the U.S.S.R. at the International Court of

Justice for damage suffered within their state. In reality, no such case was
brought. This suggests Sweden is concerned that it too could be subject to third
party claims, such as those resulting from acid rain pollution damage.
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may be essential to the success of many environmental protection
53
agreements."
The meaning of strict liability and absolute liability in the
context of activities affecting the environment is particularly
relevant to hazardous or ultrahazardous activities and has
created substantial problems for the I.L.C. The most visible
ultrahazardous activity is nuclear and there is precedent for
finding liability in cases where nuclear operations have caused
environmental damage.54
The treaties pertaining to nuclear
accidents have adopted a variety of approaches.5 5 Other treaties
have addressed the harms caused by such specialized problems
5 6
as objects that fall to earth from outer space.
The I.L.C. has had considerable difficulty addressing
ultrahazardous activities. 5 7 The I.L.C. created a working group

and later adopted the group's recommendations. 5
In essence,
the I.L.C. is attempting to create consensus within itself on the

53.
Jutta Brunnde, The Responsibility of States for Environmental Harm in a
Multinational Context-Problems and Trends, 34 LES CAHIERS DE DROIT [C. DE D.]
827,
845 n.96 (citing A.
Rest, New Tendencies in Environmental
Liability/Responsibility Law, 21 ENVTL. POL'Y & L. 135 (1991) (supporting the
adoption of instruments of legal responsibility and liability)).
54.
See Paul C. Szasz, Measuring Liabilityfor Damage Due to Radioactivity,
in INTERNATIONAL LAWAND POLLUTION 175, 175-95 (Daniel B. Magraw ed., 1991).
55.
Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, July
29, 1960, 956 U.N.T.S. 251 (1974); Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear
Damage, May 21, 1963, 1063 U.N.T.S. 265, reprinted in INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC
ENERGY AGENCY, INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS ON CIVIL LIABILITY FOR NUCLEAR
DAMAGE 7 (1976).
56.
E.g., Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by
Space Objects, Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187.
57. The location of this topic at the outer edge of progressive
development, changes in the person of the special rapporteur and
conflicting guidance from the General Assembly have contributed to the
Commission's difficulties in dealing with it.
In the debate in the
Assembly's Sixth Committee in 1991, some states called for broadening
the scope of the item, others for narrowing it and some for treating it in
accordance with, and as a part of, the topic of state responsibility. Still
others noted key areas in which it diverged widely from traditional notions
of state responsibility.
Robert Rosenstock, Current Development, The Forty-Fourth Session of the
InternationalLaw Commission, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 138, 142 (1993).
58.
On the recommendation of the working group, the Commission: (1)
declined to make any final decision on the precise scope of the topic; (2) decided
that it should cover both prevention and remedial measures and that prevention
should be considered first; and (3) decided to deal, at least at this stage, with
activities involving a substantial risk of causing transboundary harm and not with

other activities that, in fact, cause harm. Id.
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basic issues of prevention and remediation. 59

If general

consensus does develop, the I.L.C. will be able to move on to
consideration of the specific mechanisms that should be used to
address ultrahazardous risks.60

III. THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE AND THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF

BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY
state
law and
Traditional models of international
for
responsibility
focus
upon
ensuring
compensation
transboundary damages and do not adequately address the
challenges arising in international environmental law. The classic
model poses a bilateral conflict between one state as actor and
another state as victim, with significant physical harm occurring
across national boundaries attributable to the first state.
Emerging conflicts over the fundamental assumptions and value
choices inherent in the "sustainable development" and
"sustainable use" of nonrenewable natural resources located
within a given state do not fit the bilateral paradigm. Presently,
unless some transboundary damage is implicated, no state may
raise a legal objection to the domestic environmental policies of
any other state.
Within the confines of their own borders,
international law permits each state to deplete or injure its
natural resources, to destroy its gene pool, species, and habitats,
and to otherwise harm its environment. Thus, the traditional
model of international environmental law creates a jurisdictional
problem.
A second problem is that the long-standing "duty and
damages for breach" model is inherently reactive and simply
cannot prevent the loss of biological diversity, the despoliation of

59.

Id. In other words, the Commission will focus first on preventive

measures in respect of activities creating a substantial risk of harm, and then on

remedial measures after harm has occurred.

The goal is to create, in this

manner, agreement in the Commission on basic elements of its work on the topic.
60. It remains to be seen whether this procedure will enable the
Commission to free itself of the difficulties it has faced. If so, the
Commission may be able to focus on various approaches, including

insurance schemes of the type contained in the International Convention
on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage and the 1971 International
Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for
Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage. These instruments reflect a
market-oriented socialization of the risk with regard to one class of
undeniably useful, indeed essential, activities known to be ultrahazardous

in terms of their potential damage.
Id. at 142-43.
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Antarctica, or the destruction of the ozone layer. Although the
reactive model once may have been an appropriate response to
transfrontier air or water pollution, today a growing number of

environmental problems do not fit the mold of narrowly-defined
transfrontier pollution and duties imposed on single states.
International relations in the field of environmental protection
61
have developed mostly in multilateral frames.
A new, more preventive model is needed to protect
transnational ecosystems and the global commons. Under the
new model, proponents of development will bear the burden of
proving, before they proceed, that the planned use is sustainable
and that no harm will result from proposed development. Only
compliance with standards based on the precautionary principle 62
and international cooperation 63 will provide the necessary
protection for the planet. Ultimately, achieving conservation and
sustainable use of biodiversity and nonrenewable natural
resources will require changes in human production and
consumption. Certain groups or individuals in society will have
to sacrifice short-term gains for long-term benefits and to
consider meeting the basic needs of future generations as well as
those of the present. 64 International law and state responsibility
doctrines must necessarily expand to reflect this new imperative
for precautionary approaches to human activity and their
regulation.
A. The PrecautionaryPrinciple

The precautionary principle has been defined in two ways. It
has been defined as an international application of the German
6 5 It has
law principle of precautionary action (vorsorgeprinzip).

61.

Alexandre Kiss, PresentLimits to the Enforcement of State Responsibility

for Environmental Damage, in INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR ENVIRONMENTAL

HARM 3 (Francesco Francioni &Tulio Scovazzi eds., 1991).
62.
See David Freestone & Ellen Hey, Introduction: Origins and
Development of the PrecautionaryPrinciple, in THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE AND
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: THE CHALLENGE OF IMPLEMENTATION (David
Freestone & Ellen Hey eds., forthcoming 1995).
63.
"States shall cooperate in a spirit of global partnership to conserve,
protect and restore the health and integrity of the Earth's ecosystem." Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Conference on Environment
and Development, June 15, 1992, UNCED Doc. A/CONF.151/5/Rev.1, princ. 7,
reprintedin 31 I.L.M. 874 (1992) [hereinafter Rio Declaration].
64.
See generally EDITH BROWN WEISS, IN FAIRNESS TO FUITURE GENERATIONS
(1989) (discussing the theory of intergenerational equity and its application to
environmental issues).
65.
Lothar Gfindling, The Status in International Law of the Principle of
PrecautionaryAction, in THE NORTH SEA: PERSPECTIVES ON REGIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
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also been defined as the variety of regulatory approaches adopted
by governments to implement the vorsorgeprinzipprinciple; efforts
to control emissions at their source by using best available
technology are one example of this definition in practice.6 The
precautionary principle can be used as a theory and justification
for environmental strict liability; this perspective is rooted in the
tort law goal of providing compensation to victims of harm. The
precautionary principle also may be understood more broadly as a
duty to take precautionary action and to avoid risk. 6 7 In practice,
the precautionary principle informs a substantive duty of care
that requires environmental impact assessments or other
regulatory investigations prior to permitting given actions.

The phrase "the precautionary principle" has appeared in a
number of international instruments. Its meaning varies from
"its weakest formulations... to its strongest [in which] it can be
seen as a reversal of the normal burden of proof, as in the Oslo
Convention Prior Justification Procedure." 68
Several recent
United Nations documents, including the 1992 Rio Declaration,
have articulated the precautionary principle: "In order to protect
the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely
applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are
threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific
certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing costeffective measures to prevent environmental degradation." 6 9 In
another formulation, the preamble to the U.N. Convention on
Biological Diversity also refers to the precautionary principle, but
omits phrases such as "according to their capabilities" and "costeffective" measures, which qualify the language of the Rio
Declaration. The Biodiversity Convention declares its intentions
by, "[nioting also that where there is a threat of significant
reduction or loss of biological diversity, lack of full scientific
certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing measures

COOPERATION,

COASTAL LAW

SPECIAL ISSUE OF THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ESTUARINE AND

23, 23 (1990) (citing H. von Lersner, Vorsorgeprinzip, in

HANDWORTERBUCH DES UMWELTRECHTS 1086 (1988)).

66.

Id.

67.
See, e.g., James Cameron &Juli Abouchar, The PrecautionaryPrinciple:
A Fundamental Principle of Law and Policy for the Protection of the Global
Environment, 14 B.C. INT'L& COMP. L. REV. 1 (1991) (summarizing examples of the
precautionary principle in national legislation, European Community (EC) law,
and international declarations); Panel, New Developments in International
Environmental Law, 85 PROC. AM. SOCY INTL L. 401, 413-17 (1991) (remarks by
Professor Daniel Bodansky).
68.
David Freestone, The PrecautionaryPrinciple, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
CLIMATE CHANGE 21, 30 (Robin Churchill & David Freestone eds., 199 1).
69.
Rio Declaration, supranote 63, princ. 15.
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to avoid or minimize such a threat."70 In the Biodiversity Treaty,
the language of obligation has been softened by using "should" to
replace the mandatory "shall" used in the Rio Declaration. Other
references to the precautionary principle appear in recent
multilateral treaties, conference declarations, and regional
agreements, especially in agreements related to oil pollution of the
North Sea. It has been noted that the precautionary principle
turns away from the 'assimilative capacity' approach to
environmental pollution, and recognizes the limitation to scientific
knowledge on ecosystems. 7 1
Each of these formulations of the precautionary principle
gives rise to different applications of the international law of state
responsibility and liability. At its strongest, the precautionary
principle may be interpreted to prohibit virtually all uses of
natural resources and all human activities in certain ecosystems.
Such a moratorium could continue indefinitely, until sufficient
scientific knowledge developed about the effects of proposed
activities or uses. At its weakest, the precautionary principle may
be merely hortatory language that is intended to guide states as
they adopt national legislation and plans.
This permissive
approach to resource use and human activity creates a balancing
of interests that makes it possible for developmental and quality

of life considerations to outweigh the need to conserve biodiversity
and take other preventive action. Although the international
community may strive to achieve an expansive application of the
precautionary principle in the future, the permissive
interpretation dominates the status quo.
The precautionary principle has appeared as soft law in
numerous conference declarations and other statements of what
governments think international law should be. In the absence of
strong evidence of state practice and opinio juris,7 2 such as an
explicit statement from a high-level government minister that
precautionary measures were adopted because they are mandated
under international law, it is difficult to conclude that the
precautionary principle is currently customary international
law. 7 3
Examples of national legislation that refer to the

70.
71.

Biodiversity Convention, supranote 3, pmbl., para. 9.
Ellen Hey, The PrecautionaryConcept in Environmental Policy and Law:

InstitutionalizingCaution,4 GEO. IN'L ENVTL. L. REV. 303, 307-09 (1992).

72.

The opiniojuriscommunis, or expression of a legal obligation, relates to

a nation's perception of its duties. Proof of obligation can be found in decisions of
national courts, and in statements by leaders and jurists as to the legal effect of a
declaration, etc. See, e.g., SCHACHTER, supranote 38, at 38-46.
73.
Some writers assert that the precautionary principle is recognized as
binding international law. E.g., HARALD HOHMANN, PRECAUIONARY LEGAL DUnES
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precautionary principle or that are implicitly based on such a
principle are insufficient to demonstrate a binding international
legal obligation.
Apart from any sense of legal obligation under international
law, there are many subjective variables that may affect a state's
choice of precautionary action. Precautionary actions may save
money in several situations: when there is a great likelihood that
damages will occur; when damages, while unlikely, will be of great
magnitude should they occur; and when a large number of people
are likely to be injured if the harm is not prevented. The type or
degree of damage contemplated and the ease of adopting
precautionary measures may also induce precautionary action,
particularly if there is public demand or political support for
precautionary action. A state may act voluntarily based on a
moral or ethical imperative. It may also voluntarily adopt a
precautionary course for economic reasons. Sometimes it is more
cost-efficient to prevent damage than to wait for damage to occur
and pay the resulting costs.
It is never easy to say precisely when a rule crystallizes into
customary international law. There is no convenient bright line
test or formula to apply; the number of years that have elapsed
since the original articulation of the principle and the number of
times the principle has been quoted in soft law documents are not
dispositive. To find the opinio juris, it is always necessary to
locate the reasons for state practice. 7 4 Similarly, if states adopt
the language of international instruments that are neither
binding nor intended to be binding upon the parties, then the
mere fact that states have adopted that language is insufficient to
prove that a customary rule of international law exists.
If a state happens to follow such a nonbinding principle, it
may not necessarily believe that it was under a legal compulsion
to do so and may not accept that it could be liable for breach
under international law for failing to follow the law. To structure
the definition of customary international law otherwise would be
to erase the difference between nonbinding and binding
international law, and to eliminate the incentive for states to join
the soft law declarations from which international environmental
law frequently evolves. For purposes of this article, it is not
necessary to definitively state whether the precautionary principle

AND PRINCIPLES OF MODERN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, 344 (1994). Others

are critical of this assertion. See, e.g., Gfinther Hand1, Environmental Security and
Global Change: The Challenge to InternationalLaw, in ENVIRONMENTAL PROTIcTION
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 59, 78-79 (Winfried Lang et al. eds., 1994); PATRICIA W.
BIRNIE & AIAN E. BOYLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT 98 (1992).
74.
See SCHACHMER, supranote 38.
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is or is not customary law. Rather, the question is whether the
precautionary principle affects the international law of state
responsibility and liability when the principle is or becomes law,
either through treaty obligations or through the future
development of customary international law.
The relationship between state responsibility and the
precautionary principle has yet to be fully defined. The first
element of state responsibility is the existence of a clear legal duty
or obligation that gives rise to the concept of an "internationally
wrongful act."7 5 The second element is a breach of the legal duty.
The next step is evaluation of possible defenses to the breach.
Finally, compensation for victims of the breach must be
determined.
The first element is the crux of the relationship between the
If the
precautionary principle and state responsibility.
precautionary principle has not yet risen to the level of a legal
duty or obligation, then it is difficult or even impossible to move
on to the problems of breach, defenses, and compensation.
76
Certainly, it may also be impossible to deter harmful behavior.
Because the concept of environmental harm is relatively new in
international law, there are few clearly-defined internationally
wrongful acts that could trigger state responsibility. As principles
of international environmental law become recognized as binding
law through customary law and treaty law, more obligations will
exist.
Breach of those obligations may then lead to state
responsibility.
At present, a state's failure to follow the
precautionary principle is not an internationally wrongful act that
can trigger state responsibility. Even when a state is obligated by
treaty to observe the precautionary principle, an internationally
wrongful act has not necessarily occurred. It is necessary to
examine the precise language of the treaty obligation. If the
treaty says "should" instead of "shall," the offending state is not
bound.
Similarly, state obligations are often conditioned by
phrases such as "to the extent practicable" and "according to their
capabilities." Treaties frequently require adoption of only those
preventive measures that are "cost-effective." Another problem in

75.

See discussion suprapart II.A.

76.

Deterrence theory posits that a change in behavior will occur when the

threatened consequences of an act become too painful or expensive, and when it

is clear that such consequences will occur. Deterrence works only if the
consequences are sufficiently unpleasant.
For a discussion by a leading proponent of deterrence theory in U.S. law, see
GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OFAcCIDEms: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 68-94
(1970) (discussing the general deterrence approach in the context of accident
costs of activities); Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict
Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055 (1972).
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the relationship between the precautionary principle and the law
of state responsibility is that some treaties referring to the
precautionary principle are quite new and have not entered into
force. In such situations, it is impossible to gauge the extent of
compliance to be expected from states parties, or to imagine
extending the obligation to states not party to the treaty. If the
treaty is regional, it is difficult to draw out a clear rule of
international law with global applicability.
Furthermore, the
how to determine
problem identified by Gfindling 77 remains:
what action must be taken to fulfill the obligation.
One starting point is to consider the relationship between the
precautionary principle and Principle 21 of the Stockholm
Declaration.7" It may be possible to .achieve compliance with
Principle 21 through observation of the precautionary principle.
Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration 7 9 is an example of an
international environmental text containing the principle of state
responsibility.8 0 It states that all nations have a responsibility to
ensure that activities under their jurisdiction or control do not
cause damage to the environment of other states or to areas
beyond national jurisdiction. Principle 21 should be read in

conjunction with Principle 22, which calls for the development of
international law "regarding liability and compensation for the
victims of pollution and other environmental damage . .. "81
The Stockholm Declaration can also be read as a policy shift.
Some developed nations addressed newly-recognized global
environmental problems and, at the same time, some developing
nations asserted sovereignty over their own natural resources.
The broadening of the responsibility concept can be seen both in
the second clause of Principle 21 and in the World Charter for
Nature,8 2 in which states accepted the responsibility principle in
relation both to other states and to nature itself. Perhaps the
notion of state responsibility to nature will be further extended in
the future to include a state's responsibility to international civil
society. 8 3
The foregoing discussion demonstrates that the
principle of precautionary action may be considered a secondary

See Gfindling, supranote 65.
77.
78.
Stockholm Declaration, supra note 1. The Stockholm Declaration
created an obligation under international customary law.
79.
Id. princ. 21.
80.
ALEXANDRE KISS & DINAH SHELTON, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
348-49 (1991).
81.
Stockholm Declaration, supranote 1, princ. 22.
82.
World Charter for Nature, supra note 2.
83.
See Ronnie D. Lipschutz, Reconstructing World Politics: The Emergence
of Global Civil Society, 21 MILLENNIUM: J. INTL STUD. 389 (1992).
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obligation or a cpnsequence of the states' primary responsibility
not to harm the territory of another state or the territory beyond
national jurisdiction. It remains to be seen whether Principle 21
applies to harms that occur within a state's own territory.
Efforts to link Principle 21 to states' responsibility not to
by the
obligations are supported
breach international
recommendations of the World Commission on Environment and
Development. 8 4 The Brundtland Report noted that "recognition
by states of their responsibility to ensure an adequate
environment for present as well as future generations is an
The
important step toward sustainable development."8 5
environmental
Brundtland
Report
defimed
international
obligations the breach of which triggers the duty to pay
compensation by saying that states have a responsibility toward
their own citizens and to other states.8 6 While the Brundtland
Report provides a road map for the future development of general
principles of international environmental law, it is not a source of
binding legal duties or obligations for states.
convened a group of legal
The Brundtland Commission
experts that drafted one obligation on state responsibility and a
second obligation on "liability for transboundary environmental
interferences resulting from lawful activities"; the International
Law Commission divided consideration of the two subjects in a
similar manner.8 7 The main object of the liability article clearly is
payment of compensation for transboundary environmental harm.
Indeed, the article seems to assume that the cost of preventing
harm or reducing the risk is so great that prevention is

84.

WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, OUR COMMON

FUTURE 348-51 (1987) [hereinafter THE BRUNDTLAND REPORT].
85.
Id. at 330.
86.
The Brundtland Report specifically recognized obligations of states to
maintain ecosystems and related ecological processes essential for the
functioning of the biosphere; to maintain biological diversity by ensuring the
survival and promoting the conservation in their natural habitats of all species of
flora and fauna; to observe the principle of optimum sustainable yield in the
exploitation of living natural resources and ecosystems; to prevent or abate
significant environmental pollution or harm; to establish adequate environmental
protection standards; and to undertake or require prior assessments to ensure
that major new policies, projects, and technologies contribute to sustainable
development. Id. at 331.
87.
EXPERTS GROUP ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW OF THE WORLD COMMISSION ON
ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND SUSTAINABLE

DEVELOPMENT:
LEGAL PRINCIPLES AND RECOMMENDATIONS 80, 84, 127 (1987)
This
[hereinafter ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT].
admirable final report is not binding international law, but represents consensus
among a small group of highly skilled legal experts from every region and legal
system in the world.
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realistically impossible.8 8 In Article 11, the state responsibility
article of the Brundtland Commission's legal experts group
report,8 9 the mandate is much broader than in Article 21.90

Id. arts. 11 and 21.
88.
Article 11: Liability for transboundary environmental interferences
89.
resulting from lawful activities.
1. If one or more activities create a significant risk of substantial harm as
a result of a transhoundary environmental interference, and if the overall
technical and socio-economic cost or loss of benefits involved in
preventing or reducing such risk far exceeds in the long run the advantage
which such prevention or reduction would entail, the State which carried
out or permitted the activities shall ensure that compensation is provided
should substantial harm occur in an area... beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction.

2. A State shall ensure that compensation is provided for substantial
harm caused by transboundary environmental interferences resulting
from activities carried out or permitted by that State notwithstanding that
the activities were not initially known to cause such interferences.
This obligation to ensure that compensation is provided constitutes
an instance of strict liability under international law, to the extent that the
State of origin is financially liable vis-A-vis the victim State for the harmful
consequences of an act not prohibited under international law ...
Such liability may arise for activities which involve a risk of causing
extraterritorial harm of a possibly exceptionally serious dimension, i.e. for
so-called ultrahazardous activities.
The increasing acceptance of strict liability for ultrahazardous
activities at the national level is evidence of an emerging principle of
(national) law recognized by civilized nations. As known, according to
Article 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, such a
principle may also govern the relationship between sovereign States when
there is no treaty or rule of customary international law calling for the
application of a different principle or rule.
Id. at 80-84.
Article 21:
90.
1. A State is responsible under international law for a breach of an
international obligation relating to the use of a natural resource or the
prevention or abatement of an environmental interference.
2. In particular, it shall:
(a)cease the internationally wrongful act;
(b) as far as possible, re-establish the situation which would have existed
if the internationally wrongful act had not taken place;
(c) provide compensation for the harm which results from the
internationally wrongful act;

(d) where appropriate, give satisfaction for the internationally wrongful act.
The notion of State responsibility must not be confused with the notion of
strict liability under international law .

.

.

.

While the rules and

principles of international law regarding State responsibility (also called
secondary rules and principles of international law) deal with the
occurrence and the consequences of internationally wrongful acts, i.e.
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Under Article 11, the state must cease the internationally
wrongful act and restore the status quo ante as far as possible.
Where appropriate, the state must give satisfaction and pay
compensation for harm caused by its breach of international
obligations.
In order to identify the possible impact of the precautionary
principle upon the international law of state responsibility, it is
necessary to examine the nature of the obligations that the
precautionary principle as international law would create. Given
the uncertainty over the scope and meaning of the precautionary
principle and the extent to which it obligates a state to act,
violation of the precautionary principle presently does not
constitute a breach of international law. This section suggests
that the precautionary principle may develop into its own treaty
and customary norm. If this occurs, the precautionary principle
will be analytically similar to the duty to warn and the duty to
mitigate; through these duties a link will be forged between state
responsibility and the obligation not to harm the territory of
another state or the territory beyond national jurisdiction.
B. The PrecautionaryPrincipleand BiologicalDiversity

International biodiversity law and policy objectives are
strongly affected by ideas concerning the value of biodiversity and
the root causes of biodiversity loss. These same value judgments
affect related national and regional policies and laws. Valuing
biodiversity is difficult because little is understood about genes,
species, and ecosystems. First, biodiversity has direct economic
value from products derived from biodiversity, such as medicines
or new breeds of animals or plants. Second, biodiversity has
indirect value, such as ecotourism.
Third, biodiversity possesses options value, because it offers
uses not yet known but of value to future generations. Fourth,
biodiversity possesses existence value, which is drawn from the
mere continuance of life forms in and of themselves, without
regard for their economic utility. In addition to these economic,
aesthetic, and ethical values, biodiversity has ecological and
scientific value, because it is a storehouse of genes and microorganisms that may permit organisms and ecosystems to recover

breaches of so-called primary rules or principles of international law, strict

liability involves the financial accountability of States under international
law for the harmful consequences of acts which are not unlawful under
international law.
Id at 127.
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from various afflictions. The World Charter for Nature recognized
humanity's powerful impact upon the environment, 9 1 the benefits
93
of biodiversity,9 and the causes of biodiversity destruction.
Given the potential transboundary impact of the loss of
biodiversity and the attendant mitigation costs, loss of
biodiversity is clearly a matter of international concern.
Furthermore, human activity is undeniably responsible for the
Human activity is
accelerating loss of global biodiversity. 94
rapidly altering both terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems at an
unprecedented and alarming rate. Human impact far exceeds the
impact of catastrophic natural events, such as periodic fires,
floods, and pestilence, that have occurred since prehistoric times.
Although the planet possesses a remarkable ability to recuperate
from natural disasters and even some human-made disasters,
many authorities agree that the planet has reached the limits of

its endurance.

95

Conditions of poverty are the impetus for the governments of
developing countries to seek an improved quality of life for their
This legitimate and worthy goal must be
citizens.
counterbalanced by the need to prevent further loss of
biodiversity or, at the least, to make informed choices reflecting
both long-term and short-term costs and benefits. Importantly,
the Rio Declaration repeated the World Charter for Nature's

"[Human beings] can alter nature and exhaust natural resources by
91.
[their] action[s] . . . and, therefore, must fully recognize the urgency of
maintaining the stability and quality of nature and of conserving natural
resources." World Charter for Nature, supra note 2, pmbl., para. 8.
"Lasting benefits from nature depend upon the maintenance of
92.
essential ecological processes and life support systems, and upon the diversity of
life forms, which are jeopardized through excessive exploitation and habitat
destruction by [human beings]...." Id. pmbl., para. 11(a).
"The degradation of natural systems owing to excessive consumption
93.
and misuse of natural resources, as well as to failure to establish an appropriate
economic order among peoples and among States, lead to the breakdown of the
economic, social and political framework of civilization...." Id. pmbl., para.

11(b).
"Both affluence and poverty contribute to extinctions, through
94.
unsustainable consumption patterns.. . habitat loss, commercial hunting and
poaching, predator and pest control, pets and decorative plants, climate change
and pollution, and introduced or alien species." WALIER V. REID & KENTON R.
MILLER, KEEPING OPTIONS ALIVE: THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS FOR CONSERVING BIODIVERSITY
3 (1989).
See, e.g., JAMES E. LOVELOCK, GAIA: A NEW LOOK AT LIFE ON EARTHi
95.
(1979); JAMES LOVELOCK, THEAGESOF GAIA (1988) (discussing the Gaia hypothesis,
which states that "the temperature, oxidation state, acidity, and certain aspects of
the rocks and waters are at any time kept constant, and that this homeostasis is

maintained

by

active

feedback

processes

unconsciously by the biota .... " Id. at 19).

operated

automatically

and
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concern 6for unsustainable consumption and production
9
patterns.
The Convention on Biological Diversity requires party states
to draw up national plans and legislation to achieve the
Convention's objectives. If a state produces a plan claiming to
address the conservation and sustainable use of biological
diversity, that state has fulfilled its Convention obligations. At
present, no mechanism exists to assess the substantive adequacy
and consistency of national plans with the goals of the
Convention. Without this important oversight mechanism, it is
nearly impossible to charge a state party with breach of its
Convention obligations.
Similarly, until clear international
standards of sustainability are developed, it is impossible to gauge
the effects of a state's plan or a proposed activity on the long-term
conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity.

The Convention also failed to explain its relationship to other
treaties, such as the Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species 9 7 and the Ramsar Convention. 98 Under the

96.
"To achieve sustainable development and a higher quality of life for all
people, States should reduce and eliminate unsustainable patterns of production
and consumption and promote appropriate demographic policies."
Rio
Declaration, supra note 63, princ. 8.
[T]hrough the rapid acceleration of science and technology, [human beings
have] acquired the power to transfer [their] environment in countless ways
and on an unprecedented scale.
In our time, [the human] capability to transform... surroundings, if used
wisely, can bring to all peoples the benefits of development and the
opportunity to enhance the quality of life. Wrongly or heedlessly applied,
the same power can do incalculable harm to human beings and the
human environment. We see around us growing evidence of [hu]manmade harm in many regions of the earth: dangerous levels of pollution in
water, air, earth and living beings; major and undesirable disturbances to
the ecological balance of the biosphere; destruction and depletion of
irreplaceable resources; and gross deficiencies, harmful to the physical,
mental and social health of [all people], in the [hu]man-made environment,
particularly in the living and working environment.
In the developing countries most of the environmental problems are
caused by under-development. Millions continue to live far below the
minimum levels required for a decent human existence, deprived of
adequate food and clothing, shelter and education, health and sanitation.
Stockholm Declaration, supranote 1.
97.
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild
Fauna and Flora, Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243 [hereinafter
CITES].
98.
Ramsar Convention, supra note 4.
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specific language of the treaty, the general "last in time rule"9 9 of
treaty interpretation and preemption does not apply. Determining

the effect of an action taken

instruments is difficult.

under multiple international

The Law of the Sea Treaty'0°

clearly

trumps the Biodiversity Convention according to the Convention
itself.10 1 But under earlier conservation and wildlife treaties, it is
much less certain whether a decision from the Conference of the
Parties (COP) overrides a decision by the treaty body of a different
instrument. The interrelationship and overlapping jurisdiction of
For example, the
various U.N. bodies also creates problems.
numerous fora
in
debated
location of the forests issue is being
Diversity; the
Biological
on
the
Convention
including the COP to
1° 2
the
(CSD);
Development
U.N. Commission on Sustainable
Agriculture
and
Food
U.N.
Global Environment Facility (GEF); the
Organization (FAO); and other treaty bodies. Although this may
be a salutory multi-fora approach to a complicated problem, it
may also permit special interests to "forum-shop" for a receptive
audience.
New treaties and soft law declarations of the past two decades
and states' increasingly serious reports on their environmental
protection activities have created an international environmental

The "last in time rule" provides that in the case of a direct conflict
99.
between a treaty and a federal statute, the last in time will prevail. See, e.g.,
United States v. Dian, 476 U.S. 734, 738 (1986).
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature
100.
Dec. 10, 1982, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/122, 21 I.L.M. 1261.
The Convention
Biodiversity Convention, supra note 3, art. 23.
101.
"imposes upon Contracting Parties an affirmative obligation to implement the
Convention in accordance with and subject to the customary international law of
the sea, including the law reflected in" the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea.
Melinda Chandler, The Biodiversity Convention: Selected Issues of Interest to the
InternationalLauyer, 4 COL. J. INr'L ENVIL. L. & POL' 141,153 (1993).

102.

One opportunity arose in April 1995, the consideration by the U.N.

Commission on Sustainable Development of Article 15 of Agenda 21 on
biodiversity. Accordingly, the COP considered a statement to transmit to the
high-level segment of the Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD).
The statement adopted at Nassau acknowledged the complementarity of the
Commission on Sustainable Development's consideration of biodiversity and the
work of the COP under the Convention on Biological Diversity. The COP
requested the CSD to consider the provisions of the treaty when reviewing
elements of sustainability under Agenda 21, and offered to jointly explore ways in
issues can be developed within the Convention and its three objectives. The COP
further considered biodiversity as a multisectoral issue, which is relevant to
virtually all the concerns involved in sustainable development, and is closely
interrelated to poverty. The statement concluded that the COP and the CSD
"should establish links . . . to facilitate a collaborative approach to issues of
mutual concern." Draft decision on statement of the Conference of the Partiesto the
Commission on SustainableDevelopment submitted by the Chairman of the Contact
Group, at 7, 18, UNEP Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/1/CW/L. 9 (1994).
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The goals of conservation,

sustainable use, and equitable benefit-sharing have at last

elicited common efforts at the local, national, and international
levels that are mutually reinforcing, as will be seen in the next
subsection's examination of the international law on biodiversity.
C. 'Soft Law," CustomaryInternationalLaw, and Treaty Law
Related to Responsibilityfor Biodiversity
Commentators frequently refer to international conference
statements that represent international consensus or aspiration
as "soft law,"' 0 3 a legal form that is not actually binding on states.
Soft law is the newest and most common form of law-making in
the international system; it frequently appears in new areas of
international law-making in which obligations are not dependent
upon custom. International soft law states global goals and
public expectations. Once the expectations are stated, they may
lead to increased public pressure, and ultimately states may
recognize the soft law goals as enforceable international
Examples of soft law include declarations and
prohibitions.
resolutions by conferences on the ministerial level or head of state

meetings
of
scholars
or
level,2°4
multi-disciplinary
professionals, 10 5 and U.N. General Assembly resolutions. 106 Even
if soft law declarations are not initially binding, they indicate the
direction in which the international community is interested in
moving and how far states are willing to go.

103. ALEXANDRE C. KISS, SURVEY OF CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 23 (1976) (citing Rene J. Dupuy, Droit ddclaratoire et Droit
Programmatoire:de la Coutume Sauvage d la Soft Law, in LSLABORATION DU DROIl
INMERNATIONAL PUBLIC 132 (1975)). See also Christine M. Chinkin, The Challenge
of Soft Law: Development and Change in InternationalLaw, 38 INT L & COMP. L.Q.
850 (1989); Panel, A Hard Look at Soft Law, 82 PROC. AM. SOCY' INT'L L. 371
(1988).
104.
E.g., Economic Declaration from the Paris Economic Summit, July 16,
1989, reprintedin 28 I.L.M. 129 (1989).
105.
E.g., Statement of the InterAction Council Meeting on Global
Interdependence and National Sovereignty in Lisbon, Portugal, Mar. 9-11, 1990
(on file with author) (meetings of nongovernmental organizations and professional
groups to formulate positions and recommendations for the Earth Summit in Rio
de Janeiro, Brazil, June, 1992).
E.g., Protection of the Global Climate, G.A. Res. 43/53, U.N. GAOR, 43d
106.
Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/43/53 (1989), reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 1326 (1989);
Establishingthe Agenda for the UNCED, G.A. Res. 44/227 and 44/228, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/44/227-228, reprinted in 29 I.L.M. (1991); Permanent Sovereignty Over

Natural Resources, G.A. Res. 3171, U.N.

GAOR, 28th Sess., U.N. Doc.

A/RES/3171 (1974), reprintedin 13 I.L.M. 238 (1974).
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The U.N. World Charter for Nature, adopted by the General
Assembly in 1982, is a good illustration of a "soft law" that
formulated a rule and caused some countries to follow the rule as
a matter of policy.' 0 7 The General Assembly "expressed its
conviction that the benefits which could be obtained from nature
depended on the maintenance of natural processes and on the
diversity of life forms and that those benefits were jeopardized by
the excessive exploitation and the destruction of natural
habitats."I0 8
The General Assembly also "solemnly invited
Member States, in the exercise of their permanent sovereignty
over their natural resources, to conduct their activities in
recognition of the supreme importance of protecting natural
systems, maintaining the balance and quality of nature and
conserving natural resources, in the interests of present and
1 9
future generations." 0
The World Charter for Nature was adopted against this
background as a statement of aspirations. The Charter contained
a number of far-reaching significant statements regarding the
relationship of human beings to other forms of life and the
consequences of human activity for natural resources. Some of
these statements were dropped or altered significantly in the
UNCED documents and in the Biodiversity Treaty ten years later.
The general principles in the World Charter for Nature included
1 11
respect for nature,1 1 0 preservation of global genetic resources,
113
global conservation, 112 and sustainable use.

107.
World Charter for Nature, supra note 2, pmbl. General Assembly
Resolution 37/7 was adopted on October 28, 1982, by a vote of 111 in favor to 1
against (United States), with 18 abstentions (Algeria, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil,
Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Ghana, Guyana, Lebanon,
Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, the Philippines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, and
Venezuela). Later the U.N. Secretariat was informed that Mexico had intended to
vote in favor of the Resolution.
108. Id.
109.
Id.
110. "Nature shall be respected and its essential processes shall not be
impaired." Id. art. I1().
111. "The genetic viability on the earth shall not be compromised; the
population levels of all life forms, wild and domesticated, must be at least
sufficient for their survival, and to this end necessary habitats shall be
safeguarded." Id. art. 1(2).
112. "All areas of the earth, both land and sea, shall be subject to these

principles of conservation; special protection shall be given to unique areas, to

representative samples of all the different types of ecosystems and to the habitats
of rare or endangered species." Id. art. 1(3).
113. "Ecosystems and organisms, as well as the land, marine

and

atmospheric resources that are utilized by [human beings], shall be managed to
achieve and maintain optimum sustainable productivity, but not in such a way as
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Customary international law is another recognized method of
international lawmaking.
The central problem in customary
international law is determining whether and when a rule has
reached the point of universality and legality. Although the
traditional two-pronged test of customary international law
searches for evidence of state practice and evidence of opinio juris,
the test does not necessarily provide a simple answer. Principle
14
21 of the Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment
provides a useful case study of the long road leading to becoming
customary international law. Principle 21 provides that "[sitates
have . . . the sovereign right to exploit their own resources
pursuant to their own environmental policies, and the

responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or
control do not cause damage to the environment of other states or
of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction."' 1 5
This
statement is the result of a long progression that began with the
appearance of the general idea of the principle in the Trail Smelter
arbitration, 116 a decision with no precedential value in any
judicial forum. Trial Smelters principle was repeated in a decision
1 17
of the International Court of Justice in the Corfu Channel case,
and later included as part of the declaration of the 1972
Stockholm Conference. The principle was repeated more strongly
in the "soft law" World Charter for Nature resolution. Each of
these steps was evidence that at some point, Principle 21 had
become customary law. 118 Finally, the principle became hard law
when it was included in the U.N. Convention on Biological
Diversity.
The language that became Principle 21, and later Article 3 of
the Convention on Biological Diversity, changed slightly through
its various incarnations. The Trail Smelter arbitration decision
said that no state has the right "to use or permit the use of its
territory in such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to
the territory of another or the properties or persons therein, when
the case is of serious consequences and the injury is established
by clear and convincing evidence." 1 19 The Corfu Channel case

to endanger the integrity of those other ecosystems or species with which they
coexist." Id. art. 1(4).
114. For the authoritative history of the negotiations over each principle in
the Stockholm Declaration, see Louis B. Sohn, The Stockholm Declarationon the
Human Environment, 14 HARV. INr'L L.J. 423 (1973).

115.

Stockholm Declaration, supranote 1, princ. 21.

116.
117.
118.
119.

Trail Smelter Case, supra note 21.
Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 9).
See, e.g., KISS & SHEL'ON, supra note 80.
Trail Smelter Case, supra note 21, at 1965.
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expanded the general principle to recognize every state's
obligation not to knowingly allow its territory to be used for acts
contrary to the rights of other states.120
The Stockholm
Declaration was much more specific and prohibited states from
activities that "cause damage to the environment of other States
or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction."12 1 The U.N.
General Assembly revised the principle's language somewhat. The
"soft law" World Charter for Nature appeared and announced that
"[sitates and, to the extent they are able, other public authorities,
international organizations, individuals, groups and corporations
shall . . . [e]nsure that activities within their jurisdictions or
control do not cause damage to the natural systems located
within other States or in the areas beyond the limits of national

jurisdiction ...

"122

Although the World Charter for Nature changed the term
"environment" to "natural systems," it still limited the prohibition
against harm to areas "within other States or in the areas beyond
the limits of national jurisdiction." This jurisdictional scope
limitation persisted in later formulations, including the
Biodiversity Treaty. The addition of a phrase referring to both
nations' developmental and environmental policies emphasizes
the concern for sustainable development that was articulated
first, and most effectively, in the Brundtland Report. 123 This
concern for sustainability characterized the UNCED documents,
including the Rio Declaration, Agenda 21, and the U.N.
Convention on Biological Diversity.
In its next incarnation, Principle 21 appeared in the Rio
Declaration, and said:
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations
and the principles of international law, the sovereign right to

exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental
and developmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that

activities vithin their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage
to the environment of 2other
States or of areas beyond the limits of
4
national jurisdiction. 1

The recognized test for whether Stockholm Principle 21 has
become customary law is the traditional inquiry of evidence of

120.
Corfu Channel Case, supranote 117.
121.
Stockholm Declaration, supranote 1, princ. 21.
122. World Charter for Nature, supranote 2, art. III (21)(d).
123. The Brundtland Report, supra note 84. But note that Stockholm
Principle 13 called for states to "adopt an integrated and coordinated approach to

their development planning."
124. Rio Declaration, supranote 63, princ. 2.
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both state practice and opinio juris.125 Evidence of state practice
can be found in the presence of statements made by governments
since 1972 that support Principle 21; in the inclusion of the
principle in other treaties or formal declarations; and in the
decisions of arbitral panels and judicial bodies that cite or rely on
the principle. Opinio juris is evidenced by the writing of jurists
who claim to have found an acceptance of Principle 21 in major
legal systems around the world, as well as by a number of
bilateral and regional agreements that have referred specifically to
the Stockholm Declaration in their texts.
Each of these
documents establishes that states are following Principle 21 in
12 6
practice and believe themselves to be obligated.
Statements and declarations by the U.N. General Assembly
and other multilateral conferences that include the text of
Principle 21 can also be cited as proof that the principle has
indeed crystallized into customary law. Principle 21's language
has been copied countless times in other declarations and
resolutions. 12 7 Moreover, when Principle 21 was codified in the
Biodiversity Treaty, it earned international acceptance.
Once
codified in a treaty, Principle 21 is separately binding on all
parties to the treaty, regardless of whether it is customary law. 128
Since Principle 21 was codified in the Biodiversity Treaty, it
becomes necessary to define the meaning of Principle 21 in that
context. The existence of states' rights implies that states have a
corresponding moral, ethical, and increasingly legal responsibility.
The principle of sovereignty guarantees the right of a state to act.
Principle 21 balances that right with a state's duty to protect the
environment within its jurisdiction or control and to prevent
transboundary harm. This responsibility necessarily limits a

125. SCHACHTER, supranote 38, at 11-12.
126. RESATEMENT, supra note 15, at 101 n.8 (citing ORGANIZATION FOR
ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENr, NON-DISCRIMINATION IN RELATION TO
TRANSFRONTIER POLLUTION: LEADING OECD DOCUMENTS, 8, 32, 49 (1978); CanadaUnited States joint statement on transboundary air quality, 1979 DIG. U.S. PRAC.
INr'L L. 1612-1615; Memorandum of Intent Concerning Transboundary Air
Pollution, Aug. 5, 1980, U.S.-Can., 32 U.S.T. 2521, 2522 (expressing "common
determination to combat transboundary air pollution in keeping with their
existing international rights, obligations, commitments and cooperative practices,
including those set forth in... the 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human
Environment (footnote omitted)); Agreement to Co-operate in the Solution of
Environmental Problems in the Border Area, Aug. 14, 1983, U.S.-Mex., art. 2, 22
I.L.M. 1025 (undertaking "to the fullest extent practical, to adopt the appropriate
measures to prevent, reduce, and eliminate sources of pollution in their
respective territory which affect the border area of the other.").
127. See, e.g,, Hague Declaration on the Environment, Mar. 11, 1989, 28
I.L.M. 1308; Rio Declaration, supranote 63.
128. HENKIN ETAL., supranote 19, at 54-94.
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state's right to use its natural resources with unfettered
discretion. Similarly, international law restricts a state's right to
use force at will through the requirements of necessity and
proportionality. States' absolute sovereignty is already restricted
by the global imperative to survive in the face of grave threats to
the planet's soil, water, and air.
Absolute freedom of
consumption without regard for environmental costs and
nonsustainable means of production are also becoming the target
129
of restrictions under international law and policy.
States may find themselves increasingly under prohibitions
regarding the protection or sharing of scarce natural resources,
under both permissive and prohibitive systems of laws.
As
described above, in a permissive system, everything that is not
prohibited is permitted and states' sovereignty is absolute. In a
prohibitive system, everything not explicitly permitted is assumed
prohibited unless clear permission can be found from some

supranational source.

Principle 21 as binding customary law

appears to be a permissive system, tempering states' absolute
rights with only the responsibility not to harm the territory of
another or territory beyond national jurisdiction.
Both the
precautionary principle and Principle 21 of the Stockholm
Declaration as contained verbatim in the Biodiversity Convention
embody the concept of responsibility and need to consider
sustainability.
The shift toward prevention and responsibility, and away
from the notion of liability and compensation after harm occurs,
is a crucial step in accepting the fundamental concept of
international biological diversity.
Once the basic premises of
responsibility and sharing are accepted, resources can be
redirected to find the means to achieve these ends. Some possible
solutions include transfer of environmentally-sound technology,
access to genetic resources, and distribution of some of the
royalties from successful genetically-derived products to the
source countries and local communities. Greater international
cooperation will benefit those who participate; countries may
choose not to share, but they will be denied access to valuable
resources.
Protection of biological diversity requires more than species
preservation.
Scientists have discovered the importance of
ecosystems; they act both as corridors between habitats that
support endangered species and as rich depositories of un-

129. See, e.g., 6 AGENDA 21 & THE UNCED PROCEEDINGS 629-784 (Nicholas
A. Robinson ed., 1993) (containing the CSD discussions on implementation of
UNCED's Agenda 21 action plan).
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identified organisms. It is inadequate to measure the value of an
ecosystem by reference to its utility for human beings, because it
is impossible to value uses that have not yet been imagined.
Utility valuation also fails to account for the intrinsic value of
ecosystems and life forms. 3 0° The degree of environmental harm
and the true cost of biodiversity loss are important in decisionmaking and risk analysis; they also have implications for any
future liability and compensation regime.
Given the present
inability to accurately value biodiversity, it is best to adopt a
preventive approach rather than to risk unknown harm. The
precautionary principle does not require absolute scientific
certainty as a prerequisite to preservation of an area or species
that may be irreparably harmed before it is fully understood.
The new United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity
attempts to balance interests on a global level and represents a
general commitment to the conservation and sustainable use of
biodiversity. In an effort to clarify the interests being balanced,
the Convention carefully defines biological diversity, 13 1 biological

resources,132 and biotechnology. 133

Although the Convention

codifies Principle 21, it does not resolve the problem of liability for
the loss of biodiversity. 23
The parties to the Biodiversity Convention accepted a binding
obligation to conserve biodiversity and received an affirmation of
their sovereign right to use forests, wetlands, and other
ecosystems for development, tempered by the requirement of
sustainable use.
This obligation was a new departure for
developing countries. In return for guaranteed access to the
genetic resources located in genetically rich developing countries,
developed countries accepted an obligation to share the benefits

130.
WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUIE Er AL., GLOBAL BIODIVERSHIY STRATEGY 23
(1992).
131.
"ITihe variability among living organisms from all sources including,
inter alia, terrestrial, marine and other aquatic ecosystems and the ecological
complexes of which they are part; this includes diversity within species, between
species and of ecosystems." Biodiversity Convention, supranote 3, art. 2.
132.
"[G]enetic resources, organisms or parts thereof, populations, or any
other biotic component of ecosystems with actual or potential use or value for
humanity." Id.
133.
"[A]ny technological application that uses biological systems, living

organisms, or derivatives thereof, to make or modify products or processes for
specific uses." Id.
134. Aside from precatory remarks in a number of declarations and treaties
calling for future discussion or study, it is clear that no customary law governs
liability for biodiversity loss. The Biodiversity Convention calls for a subsequent
protocol to be drafted on the subject of liability for environmental harm. Principle
22 of the Stockholm Declaration relates specifically to environmental liability,
calling for rules or principles to be adopted.
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of biotechnology. The final compromise, then, endorsed both the
conservation of biodiversity and its sustainable use. To some,
this trade-off has ominous overtones. The Third World Network,
an Indian nongovernmental organization, fears that the North is
attempting to preserve its access to the South's genetic resources.
Thus, the South would supply the "raw material for the [North's]
next industrial revolution," in the North's privately-held
13
biotechnology industry. 5

International law does not yet possess a general theory of
state responsibility or means of calculating appropriate damages
for the accidental or willful destruction of biodiversity.
Nevertheless, since the Convention on Biological Diversity entered
into force in December 1993, it is plausible that the international
law of precautionary action may rise to the level of a duty, which
can trigger state responsibility when breached. The breach may
occur when states fail to regulate activities within their
jurisdiction or control or cause damage in areas beyond national
jurisdiction. In order to achieve the conservation and sustainable
use of biological diversity, it may be necessary to use the
international legal system to regulate or restrict development
36
patterns in accordance with the precautionary principle. 1
When a state breaches its duty to uphold the precautionary
principle, Article 3 of the Convention on Biological Diversity offers
a basis for assessing the state's responsibility. Although the duty
applies only to extraterritorial harm, the Convention's article on
jurisdictional scope may give rise to responsibility for a state's
activities, regardless of where the effect occurs.13 7
The
Convention's jurisdiction varies somewhat. The Convention's
jurisdiction over components of biodiversity is consistent with
Principle 21 and extends only to harms caused in the territory of
other states or in the territory beyond national jurisdiction. The
Convention's jurisdiction over processes and activities is

135. Dr. Vandana Shiva, Third World Network, Comments on the vital link
between biodiversity and biotechnology to UNCED PrepCom3, Geneva,
Switzerland, August 19, 1991. Similar remarks were made by the Indian
government's delegate in the UNCED Working Group I, August 21, 1991, arguing
for the joinder of the topics of biotechnology and biodiversity in the agenda for
UNCED and in Agenda 21. This suggestion was defeated by the chair, who
reminded the Working Group that the agenda had been set by the General
Assembly in G.A. Res. 44/228, December, 1989, which treated biodiversity and
biotechnology as two separate topics.
136. See Edward Christie, The Eternal Triangle: The Biodiversity Convention,
Endangered Species Legislation and the PrecautionaryPrinciple, 10 ENVTL. & PLAN.
L. J. 470 (1993).
137. For an excellent discussion of the implications of the jurisdictional
scope of the treaty, see Chandler, supra note 101, at 147-48.
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considerably broader and leaves room for further interpretation of
responsibility beyond the transborder context. Such an extension
of jurisdictional scope is inherently necessary to the conservation
of biological diversity.
New principles of international environmental law have
developed quickly in recent years in response to global
imperatives for sustainable development; nowhere is that trend
more noticeable than in the formation of international law on
biodiversity.
The United Nations Convention on Biological
Diversity, 138 which entered into force as binding international law
on December 29, 1993, has been ratified by 127 nations. 13 9 The
first Conference of the Parties took place in late 1994, formally
adopting many of the interim institutional and financial
mechanisms for the operation of the treaty established when the
treaty was opened for signature during the United Nations
Conference on Environment and Development in June, 1992.140
A declaration adopted at the close of the first COP noted that
states party to the Convention on Biological Diversity regard it "as
much more than just a set of rights and obligations: it is a global
partnership with new approaches to multilateral cooperation for

conservation and development....

14 1

The U.N. Convention on Biological Diversity represents a new
style of treaty negotiation, in that the Convention's subject matter
is very broad and the Convention was negotiated with unusual
speed and openness.
Other features also contribute to the
treaty's uniqueness.
First, the treaty pioneers an ecosystem
approach to conservation that moves beyond the species-specific
or habitat-specific approaches of earlier conservation treaties,
including those on migratory birds, wetlands, and trade in
endangered species. Second, both the preamble and the body of
the treaty emphasize the participation of women, local
communities, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in
biodiversity protection. This language is a significant departure

138. Biodiversity Convention, supranote 3.
139. A list of states party to the treaty can be found in Status of Ratification
of the
Convention on Biological Diversity, at
3-9,
UNEP
Doc.
UNEP/CBD/COP/1/Inf.4/Rev. 1 (1994). A current list of states that have ratified

the Convention can be obtained from the Interim Secretariat for the U.N.
Convention on Biological Diversity, 15 Chemin de Anemones, 1219 Chatelaine,
Geneva, Switzerland. As of August 25, 1995, 127 states had accepted, approved,
or acceded to the Convention.
140. For documentation on the U.N. Conference on Environment and
Development, held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, see 1-6 AGENDA 21 & THE UNCED
PROCEEDINGS (Nicholas A. Robinson ed., 1993).
141. The Bahamas Ministerial Declaration on the Convention on Biological
Diversity, Dec. 6, 1994, para. 6 (on file with the author).
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from most other multilateral instruments, which address only the
The Convention's
role of the states party to the treaty.
identification of nonstate actors is a recognition that successful
implementation of the treaty will require cooperation from many
sectors.
Third, the initial formulation of the treaty was marked by the
initiative and contributions of NGOs; indeed, the first draft of the
treaty was prepared by an NGO. 14 2 Fourth, the Biodiversity
Treaty is unique, because the text of Stockholm Principle 21
appears verbatim as Article 3, marking the first time this
language has appeared in binding international law, rather than
The idea of national
in "customary law" or "soft law." 14 3
sovereignty over resources is balanced or tempered to some
degree by the requirement that each state accept its responsibility
not to harm the territory of any other state or the territory beyond
its own national jurisdiction. Finally, the treaty represents a
trade-off of mutually beneficial goods, a trade-off that is possible
because both developing and developed states have something of
value that the other group wants.

Although it is too early to tell how effectively the treaty will be
implemented, there is cause for some optimism. The Convention
calls for the study of the creation of a Clearinghouse Mechanism
for Technical and Scientific Cooperation, ' " which would share
knowledge on biological diversity and promote cooperation. In
addition, the Convention establishes the Subsidiary Body on
Scientific, Technical, and Technological Advice (SBSTTA). 145 On-

142.
The World Conservation Union (IUCN) began to develop elements for a
global convention on biological diversity as early as 1981; draft articles were
prepared by the IUCN Commission on Environmental Law and the Environmental
Law Centre beginning in 1984, "[w]ell before governmental negotiations began
"
under the aegis of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). ..
Francoise Burhenne-Guilmin & Susan Casey-Lefkowitz, The Convention on
BiologicalDiversity: A Hard Won Global Achievement, 3 Y.B. INT'L ENVIt. L. 43, 44
(1992).
In customary law, a rule or principle is followed by states over time
143.
and comes to be accepted as obligatory. Customary law is a type of "soft law."
Unlike "hard law," "soft law" is any nonbinding statement, recommendation, or
declaration of principles from international meetings, conferences, the U.N.
General Assembly, or nongovernmental organizations that 'arguably . . .
constitute[s) a new source of international law.., or at least establish[es] a new
technique for creating international juridical norms." KISS & SHELTON, supra note
80, at 109.
144. Biodiversity Convention, supranote 3, art. 18(3).
145. Id. art. 25. See also Draft Decision submitted by the Chairman of the
Committee of the Whole, UNEP Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/I/L.4/Rev.1 (1994)
(describing the recommendations of the Open-Ended Intergovernmental Meeting
of Scientific Experts on Biological Diversity). The SBSTTA concept was further
of the Open-Ended
developed in
accordance with recommendations
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going discussions at the two meetings of the Intergovernmental
Committee on the Convention on Biological Diversity and at the
first COP centered on the institutional and organizational entities
needed to implement the Convention, as well as on related
concerns such as financial mechanisms, 146 intellectual property
rights, 14 7 and biosafety. 148 Most of the NGOs in attendance at

Intergovernmental Meeting of Scientific Experts on Biological Diversity, meeting in
Mexico City, Mexico, April 11-15, 1994; the report can be found in UNEP Doc.
UNEP/CBD/COP/1/16 (1994). This expert group meeting, a forerunner of the
SBSTTA, was intended to provide scientific ideas to expedite the work of the
second Intergovernmental Committee on the Convention on Biological Diversity
(ICCBD2), (Nairobi, Kenya, June 20 - July 1, 1994) and to provide the basis for
decision-making at the first COP (Nassau, Bahamas, November 28 - December 9,
1994).
The desired results of the Open-Ended Intergovernmental Meeting of Scientific
Experts on Biological Diversity, UNEP Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/1/16 (1994), may
still be considered a useful agenda for the next scientific experts meeting in Paris
(September 4-8, 1995):
a general assessment of the range and adequacy of ongoing scientific

programmes; a framework of elements that might be included in the
programme of work for the international scientific community; and
identification of the main components, including indigenous knowledge,
for technology transfer and for the assessment and management of
biological resources.
Id. at 5, para. 15.
146. A hotly contested issue was the proposed continuation of the
restructured Global Environment Facility (GEF) (a joint project of the World Bank,
the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), and the United Nations
Environment Programme (UNEP)) as the financial mechanism of the treaty.
Although many developing countries were adamantly opposed to the GEF, in the
final hours of the 1992 Nairobi treaty negotiation they accepted the GEF as an
interim financing mechanism. Since that time a number of meetings have
debated the issues underlying the GEF's role. Donor states do not want to
proceed under anything other than the GEF, and maintain that the most serious
objections to the GEF's lack of transparency and democracy have been met by the
restructuring effort in 1994.
Those opposed to the GEF call for further
restructuring and consideration of alternative funding mechanisms. UNEP Doc.
UNEP/CBD/COP/1/L.9/Add.1 (1994). Tentative progress has been made in
formulating a scale of contributions from developed countries to the GEF, which
will enable developing countries to fulfill their treaty obligations. The call for
review of additional financial mechanisms to fund biodiversity projects was
repeated at the first COP. Suggested alternatives include private donations,
project financing from multinational development banks, and financing from
other sectors that impact biodiversity. A final decision on the treaty's permanent
financing mechanism must be made at COP2 in November 1995 in Jakarta,
Indonesia.
147.
Another unresolved issue is the uniformity of parties' duties and
obligations relating to intellectual property rights. Despite the prominent role of
the United States in the negotiation of the treaty, the United States refused to
sign the Convention on June 5, 1992, in Rio de Janeiro. This refusal stemmed
from the Bush Administration's concern that intellectual property rights protected
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the meetings on the Convention in 1993 and 1994 called for
between
poverty,
the
relationships
to
address
efforts
unsustainable production and consumption, unequal trade
relations, and biodiversity; the discussions did not, however,

directly address these underlying causes of biodiversity loss.
By the end of the first COP, many of the organizational issues

required to set up a new treaty were resolved. 14 9 Meetings will be
held annually for the next three years, after which time the

matter will be reconsidered.

The United Nations Environment

Programme (UNEP) was designated the appropriate institutional

in some articles were undermined by ambiguous language in other articles. The
relationship between strong intellectual property rights protection and the
objectives of the Convention on Biological Diversity remains unclear. Developed
states ratifying the Convention have not appeared to be troubled by this point,
and the issue appears to be fading, as additional developing countries, such as
Brazil and Taiwan, consider or adopt domestic legislation establishing intellectual
property rights where none existed before. The United States eventually joined
the list of treaty signatories when President Clinton signed the Convention on
June 4, 1994, but the United States has not yet ratified the treaty.
148. The possible need for a biosafety protocol is one of the unresolved
matters from the treaty negotiations and the Agenda 21 discussions of
biotechnology in 1992 at UNCED. Biosafety continues to be a matter of concern
to many states and NGOs. The first COP created an ad hoc working group
authorized to meet for one week in Madrid, Spain (July 24-28, 1995). The
working group's mandate was first to consider the need for and modalities of a
protocol to the Convention and second to analyze parties' existing domestic
legislation regarding safety precautions and the release of genetically modified
organisms. If a biosafety protocol is created, it will address procedures for the
safe transfer, handling, and use bf any living modified organism resulting from
biotechnology. The protocol will probably address advance informed agreements,
and its scope will include any biotechnology that might adversely affect the
conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity.

149.

The first COP established certain "standing items," including the

following: the financial mechanism; the budget; reports from SBSTTA and the
Clearinghouse Mechanism; reports from the parties; and the relationship of the
Convention to the U.N. Commission on Sustainable Development and to other
conventions and institutions that are relevant to biodiversity.
In addition to annual consideration of these standing items, future COPs will
consider "rotating issues" on a year-by-year basis; each year, the COP will
consider some aspect of the Convention's three objectives. For example, the
general measures for
second meeting of the COP in 1995 will consider:
conservation and sustainable use, the form and interval for reporting by the
parties, and the need for a biosafety protocol.
In 1996, the third COP will consider: the identification, monitoring, and
assessment of biological diversity (Art. 7); the knowledge, innovations, and
practices of indigenous and local communities (Art. 86)); access to genetic
resources (Art. 15); and transfer of technology (Arts. 16, 18). In 1997, the fourth
COP will consider models and mechanisms for linkages between in-situ and exsitu conservation (Arts. 7, 8); measures for implementing the Convention (Arts.
13, 14); and considerations of benefit-sharing (Art. 19). This agenda is meant to
be flexible and may be adjusted at subsequent COPs.
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body to function as the Secretariat, and the rules of procedure

were established. Finally, the work of the next three years was
divided into topics and compiled as the Medium Term Programme
of Work of the Conference of the Parties 1995-1997.150 Despite
progress at the first COP, many aspects of the Biodiversity Treaty
remain open to interpretation. These gray areas include: state
responsibility for prevention of loss of biodiversity; the meaning of
"sustainable use" of biological diversity; the extent of a party's
obligations to enforce the treaty's objectives through domestic
laws; the relationship of the Convention to other wildlife and
habitat treaties; and the relationship of the COP and Secretariat
to other U.N. bodies whose mandates include aspects of
biodiversity.

IV. CONCLUSION
New international environmental law principles, including
sustainable development and recognition of serious human
threats to the global environment, have created new applications
for the doctrines of state responsibility and liability, although
states' environmental obligations under international law remain
ill-defined. It is difficult to reconcile most activities threatening
loss of biological diversity with the I.L.C.'s language on state
responsibility for "primary" and "secondary" obligations and
"internationally wrongful acts."
Furthermore, the concept of
"injurious consequences arising from acts not contrary to
international law"15 1 appears to be of limited use when only
ultrahazardous activities are examined. The concept's use is
limited, because biodiversity loss most frequently occurs through
the accumulation of ordinary human activities that affect an
ecosystem.

Principle 21's concept of state responsibility links sovereign
power and privilege with general obligations not to harm the
territory of another state or the area beyond national jurisdiction.
The legal principles relevant to air, space, aircraft, and maritime
boundary disputes are considerably less relevant to problems
involving micro-organisms and migratory species.
Similarly,
territorially-based concepts are not very useful in assessing
states' responsibility when they fail to regulate multinational
commercial entities that destroy or unsustainably exploit

150. Draftdecision submitted by the Chairmanof the Informal Contact Group,
UNEP Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/1/CW/L.11 & Add.1 (1994).
151. See suprapart II.B.
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biodiversity resources. One option is to define such commercial
activities as internationally wrongful or otherwise prohibited
under international law. Unfortunately, this step is unlikely to
occur. Another option is to recognize the precautionary principle
as a means to comply with state responsibility not to harm the
environment. Failure to adopt national plans or procedures
incorporating a precautionary approach may then trigger
international responsibility or liability.
In other words, a state's duty to take precautionary action
may be seen as one of a cluster of procedural norms similar to the
duties to warn other states, to mitigate damages, and to assist in
case of emergency. For example, the Rio Declaration reaffirms a
state's obligation to provide early notification in an emergency
and when activities may have a significant transboundary
impact. 15 2 The Rio Declaration also affirms a state's obligation to
assist in the event of such emergencies. 1S 3 Moreover, some states
are required by treaty to provide both early notification of risk to
other states and assistance to other states in the event of a
nuclear accident.lM The goal of these procedural norms is to
make information widely available to local communities and to the
international community so that states can make informed
choices and undertake appropriate responses. A state wishing to
comply with the principle of precautionary action may do so by
incorporating environmental impact assessment procedures in
national planning and legislation.
At the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and
(UNCED), participating states affirmed the
Development

importance of environmental impact assessment (EA) procedures
as an integral part of the development process.1 5 5

Currently,

152.
See Rio Declaration, supra note 63, princ. 18 ("States shall
immediately notify other States of any... emergencies that are likely to produce
sudden harmful effects on the environment of those States."); id. princ. 19
("States shall provide prior and timely notification and relevant information to
potentially affected States on activities that may have a significant adverse
").
transboundary environmental effect. ..
153. Id princ. 18 ("Every effort shall be made by the international
community to help States so afflicted.").
Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, Sept. 26,
154.
1986, 25 I.L.M. 1370; Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident
or Radiological Emergency, Sept. 26, 1986, 25 I.L.M. 1377. See generally
LAKSHMAN D. GURUSWAMY Er AL., INTERNA'nONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND WORLD
ORDER: A PROBLEM-ORIENTED COURSEBOOK 513-41 (1994). For a good survey of
the law of state responsibility for environmental harm, see id. at 323-59.
155.
See Rio Declaration, supra note 63, princ. 17 ("Environmental impact
assessment, as a national instrument, shall be undertaken for proposed activities
that are likely to have a significant adverse impact on the environment and are
subject to a decision of a competent national authority.").
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more than fifty nations require EIA as a matter of domestic law;

and sixteen states of the United States have adopted laws that are
more substantive than the National Environmental Protection Act

(NEPA). 156 In addition, international organizations, such as the
World Bank, have adopted EIA procedures as part of their
decision-making process.' 5 7 The popularity of EIAs is due in
large measure to their proven effectiveness in anticipating and
mitigating the adverse environmental impacts of development
projects, and their usefulness in providing environmental
information to decision-makers. Moreover, ELA procedures often
give potentially affected local communities an opportunity to
participate in the decision-making process.15 s
The widespread acceptance of environmental impact
assessments is demonstrated by the passage of the Espoo
Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a
Transboundary Context,' 5 9 which was opened for signature in
1991.
As of mid-1995, twenty-eight states have signed the
convention; a majority of Western and Eastern European states,
the United States, and Canada are among the signatories. The
convention requires parties to "take all appropriate and effective
measures to prevent, reduce, and control significant adverse
transboundary environmental impact from proposed activities.' 60
To comply with the Convention, states must notify potentially
affected states of environmental dangers, and must consult with
affected states to reduce or eliminate adverse environmental
effects. The use of EIAs, then, may be one way to implement the
precautionary principle in national and international law and

156. ZYGMUNr J.B. PLATER Er AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAWI AND POLICY: NATURE,
LAW AND SOCIEIY 230-31 (Supp. 1994) (citing David Sive, Little NEPAs and the
Environmental Impact Process, C806 A.L.I. 1, 1-4, 6-7 (1992), and Nicholas A.
Robinson, SEQRA's Siblings: Precedentsfrom Little NEPA's in the Sister States, 46
ALB. L. REV. 1155, 1156-62 (1982)). Some of the United States state laws apply to
actions by county and municipal governments as well as to state action; state
laws often contain a lower EIA threshold than the federal law. The California,
New York, and Minnesota state laws are some of the strongest. Michael C.
Blumm, The NationalEnvironmental Policy Act at Twenty: A Preface, 20 ENVrL. L.
447, 451 n.18 (1990); California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), CAL. PUB.
RES. CODE§§ 21000-21176 (West 1986 & Supp. 1995).
157.
See, e.g., Kevin Huyser, Note, Sustainable Development: Rhetoric and
Reform at the World Bank, 4 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 253 (1994).
158.
See A. Dan Tarlock, Local Government Protection of Biodiversity: What
Is Its NicheP, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 555 (1993); see generally Nicholas A. Robinson,
InternationalTrends in Environmental Impact Assessment, 19 B. C. ENVTh. AFF. L.
REV. 591 (1992).
159.
Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary
Context, Feb. 25, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 802.
160.
Id. art. 2(1).
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It is an approach with particular relevance to the
policy.
conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity.
Another conceptual way to approach the goal of biodiversity
conservation under international law, as explored supra in Part II,
The current
is through state responsibility and liability.
limitation of obligations not to harm territory within the
jurisdiction of another state or beyond the national jurisdiction
does not fully protect global biodiverse resources, for states may
still destroy such resources within their territorial boundaries
under existing international law. What is needed in the future,
then, is to extend responsibility to all states to conserve and
sustainably use such resources as a global storehouse of genetic
information or medicine chest, separate and apart from claims of
sovereign rights, unless subject to the balances and tradeoffs
negotiated in the Convention on Biological Diversity.
Applying the principle of state responsibility in areas beyond
16 1
national jurisdiction, such as Antarctica and the high seas,
creates an opportunity to apply the doctrine of state responsibility
in a context free from the claims of sovereign rights. The U.N.
Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOS) offers a plan that is
tailored for the maximum preservation of humanity's common
heritage. Similarly, Antarctica offers the chance to preserve a
unique ecosystem of "enormous scientific, ecological, spiritual,
The Madrid Protocol to the
and aesthetic importance." 16 2
1
the precautionary principle
adopts
Antarctic Treaty 6 "implicitly
1
of environmental planning." " In the concept of pollution on the
high seas, "[d]octrine and practice ... now evidence the existence
of a parallel obligation to prevent harm to the shared resource of
The 1982 LOS Convention
the high seas environment . ...
act
with 'due regard' for other
to
[codifies a duty] as the obligation
165
states."
The concept of "internationally wrongful act" creates
problems for the application of traditional notions of state
responsibility for environmental damage. Because clear norms of
international environmental law have not yet been fully and
universally recognized, the application of the doctrine of state
responsibility is not particularly useful at this time. Thus, "[i]t

See BRIAN D. SMITH, STATE RESPONSIBILITY AND THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT:
16 1.
THE RULES OF DECISION (1988).
162. David J. Bederman, The Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition's
Convention on Antarctic Conservation,4 GEO. INrL ENVTh. L. REV. 47, 47 (1991).
163. Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, Oct. 4,

1991, 30 I.L.M. 1461.
164.
165.

Bederman, supranote 162, at 49
SMITH, supranote 161, at 89.
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may be concluded that, with respect to transfrontier pollution, the
principle of state responsibility is undergoing a process of
development and consolidation, but it is not yet to be considered
to have hardened into a rule of international law." 16 6
As
discussed by the I.L.C., 1 6 7 much serious environmental harm can
result from activities that are not "wrongful" in themselves, but
whose cumulative effect is disastrous. The international system
still awaits the development of an international law on liability
and compensation for victims and a broader concept of state
environmental responsibility.16 s Obviously, the best strategy for a
state that is mindful of its responsibility is to avoid a breach of
international obligations entirely or to adopt preventive measures.
It is the duty of the international community to develop a full
understanding of those obligations.
The creation of international environmental law has led to the
recognition of certain legal obligations, such as states'
responsibility not to harm the territory of another state and the
territory beyond national jurisdiction. This responsibility should
be expanded to address threats to global resources and
biodiversity even when the threats occur within the territory of
individual states. The new international environmental legal
system should encourage states to observe their obligations to
conserve and sustainably use the environment. In cases where it
is difficult to know whether an activity is sustainable, the best
course for legislators and policy makers is to apply the
precautionary approach and prevent environmental harm. States
that take their environmental responsibilities seriously, comply
with their treaty obligations, and strengthen their national
regulatory systems need not fear the establishment of
international standards and an extended notion of state
environmental responsibility. The international community soon
must formulate a clear understanding of state environmental
responsibility that is proactive and designed to minimize risk.
The duty to take precautionary action is becoming customary
international law. As such, it offers one way for states to
undertake sustainable development, to uphold Stockholm
Principle 21, to conserve and sustainably use biological diversity,
to protect areas beyond national jurisdiction, and to meet other
In the process, states' and citizens' selfglobal obligations.

166. BRUNNrE, supra note 21, at 113 (citing Lothar Gfindling,
Verantwortlichkeit der Staaten Jfir grenziiberschreitendeUmweltbeeintrdct gungen,
45 ZErISCHRIFT FUR AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT [ZAORV]

265, 273 (1985)).
167. See suprapart II.B.
168. See Stockholm Declaration, supranote 61, princ. 22.
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interest in adopting precautionary measures will become apparent
as the Biodiversity Convention is implemented and other sources
of international law develop. 169

169. EUen Hey, Increasing Accountability for the Conservation and
Sustainable Use of Biodiversity: An Issue of Transnational Global Character, 6
COLO. J. INTL. ENVr'L L. & POL ' 1 (1995).

